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by Leslie Witz
Characteristically in a family a child is indoctrinated with
the desired desire to become a certain son or daughter ...
with a totally enjoined, minutely prescribed 'freedom' to
move within the narrow interstices of a rigid lattice of
relationship. (D. Cooper, The Death of the Family, Harmonds-
worth (1976), p. 25).
INTRODUCTION
Various historians have pointed out that during the first three
decades of the twentieth century both capital and the state incorporat-
ed white wage earners in South Africa into institutionalised struc-
tures. The white workers lost all their militancy, developed a racist
hierarchical division of labour, became entrapped in the hegemony of
bourgeois politics and their trade unions slipped into the morass of
bureaucracy. White workers, however, were not simply trapped by the
state and capital. Incorporation was a process which took over twenty
years or more to accomplish and was determined by specific conditions
facing white workers and trade unions, in particular on the Witwaters-
rand, during this period. White workers rather eased themselves into a
trap, lowered the gate, bolted it and threw away the key.
There is one group of white workers which, it is maintained, managed
to resist this incorporation: the clothing workers on the Witwaters-
rand in the 1930s and 40s. These workers were Afrikaner women who were
active members of the Garment Workers' Union (GWU), a trade union
which, it is claimed, under the leadership of Solly Sachs (its general
secretary from 1928 to 1952), displayed a high degree of militancy,
established internal democratic structures, assumed an independent
political role and firmly committed itself to non-racialism. Perhaps
the most important claim made on behalf of the union is the last for it
has been used to justify many a theoretical position in the South
African political arena. Solly Sachs himself used it to criticise the
Communist Party's almost exclusive concern with black workers. Basil
Davidson, writing in the New Statesman in 1950, wrote that the non-
racialism in the Garment Workers' Union represented the hope that
Afrikaners would forego their racialism and that black and white could
co-operate in a future free South Africa. More recently Fine, de
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Clercq and Innes used the GWU's commitment to non-racialism as an ex-
ample of how workers need not simply become incorporated into racial
structures if trade unions registered under government sponsored
legislation.
All these assertions are based on an unquestioning acceptance of the
Garment Workers' Union's official version of its stance towards black
workers in the industry. The GWU always maintained that it welcomed
blacks into its organisation, supported their struggles and through
this assistance black workers acquired substantial benefits such as
higher wages and shorter working hours. This paper will attempt to
examine this rendition critically, looking particularly at the period
1939 to 1948, a time when black workers started entering the clothing
industry on the Witwatersrand in significant numbers. However, we must
first briefly survey the period 1929 to 1938 for in those years the
roots of the GWU's policies towards black workers in the clothing in-
dustry were implanted.
Establishing the Parallels, 1929-1938
In the the inter-war years white women constituted the bulk of the
workforce in the clothing industry in the Transvaal. (see Table 1) 82%
of the workers in the industry in this area in 1937/8 were white, 14%
were Africans {only 8 out of 1 109 being women) and Coloureds and
Indians comprised the remainder. Nearly all the whites were employed
as machinists (sewing the garment) while the Africans were involved in
cleaning the factories, laying cloth out on the tables to be cut and,
above all, in pressing the completed garment.
While the white workers in the inustry could and did participate
fully in the machinery established by the Industrial Conciliation Act
of 1924 (to constitute an industrial council with employers to conclude
an industrial council agreement to cover employment conditions and to
organise into a registered trade union) the African workers were denied
such access. Registration was nonetheless not a major obstacle in
the organisation of trade unions for African workers. Indeed trade
union organisation was given a boost by the existence of wage regulat-
ing machinery which complemented the Industrial Conciliation Act, the
Wage Board established under the Wage Act of 1924. Although the Wage
Board was established by the government to promote employment of un-
organised whites in secondary industry by fixing high minimum wages
increasingly African workers utilised it to promote their own in-
terests. Since the Board could initiate an investigation of a
particular industry when a sufficiently representative group of employ-
ers or employees approached it to make such an inquiry, Africans began
organising into trade unions to make representations to the Board.
Thus, when a wage Board sitting for the clothing industry was institut-
ed in 1928 a group of African workers, with the assistance of the
Communist Party of South Africa, formed a racially separate trade union
to cover the interests of the black workers An the industry: the South
African Clothing Workers' Union (SACWU). Thus two trade unions
existed for clothing workers on the Witwatersrand. The relationship
between them was, to a large extent, determined by two interrelated
factors, the attitudes of the workers and the philosophy of Solly
Sachs.
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Members of the South African Clothing Workers' Union were always
willing to assist the Garment Workers' Union but the white workers
imbued with racist attitudes, were not prepared to reciprocate. When
the African workers offered to help the whites in a particular struggle
the whites eagerly welcomed their assistance. However, when the roles
were reversed and. .the blacks would call on the whites for help it was
not forthcoming. Thus, prior to the arrival of Solly Sachs in
November 1928 a one-sided relationship existed between the SACWU and
the GWU.
Solly Sachs' belief in a future socialist non-racial South Africa
did not tally with that of his constituency. Nonetheless his notion
that white workers could assist in bringing about such a society helped
him to accommodate their views without abrogating his principles. Black
and white workers, he argued, had to be kept apart until the latter
were re-ed,ucated and had developed a non-racial working class cons-
ciousness. He would concentrate his efforts on attempting to
achieving this by working with white workers. On the other hand he
would see to it that the black workers' organisations were assisted.
Thus he became one of the prime advocates of parallel unionism, whereby
the registered trade union (the GWU) took the unregistered trade union
(the SACWU) under its wing, offering it facilities, expertise and
access to the industrial council. Sachs felt that if the workers
were forced together in one organisation it would lead to a split in
the union, the racist workers hiving off to form their own union.
While the GWU's leaders therefore assisted the SACWU the rank and file
were kept apart. Thus, under Sachs1 auspices, the GWU's structure of
maintaining separate branches in order to ensure that the union remain-
ed intact was created.
This policy was accentuated in the late 1930s when the nascent
Afrikaner nationalist movement, attempting to gain the political and
financial support of white workers, launched an attack to take control
of the GWU. Using racism as a major weapon the Nationalists accused
Sachs of organising and "addressing kaffirs" while neglecting the
interests of white workers. The GWU's leaders therefore went out of
their way to defuse racial tension and show white workers that they
were assisting them. When racial incidents occurred at factories the
GWU organisers would approach the emnloyer and generally the African
workers involved would be dismissed. However, while the GWU kept
white and black workers apart it did give the SACWU financial and
organisational aid. This enabled the SACWU to survive the 1929-32
depression, establish a stop-order system at four factories and ensure
that African clothing workers were among the highest paid of all
African workers on the Witwatersrand by 1938.
It was also during the late 1930s that coloured workers started
entering the clothing industry on the Witwatersrand. Their positions
in the clothing factories were somewhat different to those of Africans.
All coloured workers could be organised in a registered trade union,
could participate on industrial councils and could be a party to in-
dustrial council agreements. They could also form a single union with
other workers in the industry. Furthermore the coloured workers enter-
ed the clothing industry in exactly the same jobs held by whites. None-
theless, they entered the industry at a time when whites were beginning
to leave voluntarily and thus presented no competition for their jobs.
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There ensued considerable debate among the ranks of both the white
and coloured workers on whether and how coloured workers should be
organised. The whites were vitally interested in organising the
coloureds. "... they felt that the coloured workers being nog-members
of the Union, might undermine their hard-won standards." The
majority of white workers advocated the policy that this organisation
of coloured workers should be in a parallel union, which would have its
own branch and officials and hold separate general meetings. Some of
the coloured workers who rejected thispidea felt that they were bearing
the brunt of discriminatory practices. Most of the coloured workers,
however, meekly accepted the GWU's proposals and decided to form a
parallel union.
The GWU has always maintained that it created the No. 2 branch in
order to maintain unity among the workers. The Central Executive
Committee (CEC) was particularly fearul of the union being destroyed
because of racial pressure. "It was better to have, separate branches
than to have the Union being broken up altogether." The No. 2 branch
had no representation on the Central Executive Committee or the indus-
trial council. When it did request to be represented on the former
body the Central Executive Committee "considered it ill-advised, as
they took the view of the majority of the Europeans into consideration,
and therefore did not agree to the request of the No. 2 branch" . Once
again the GWU's racial philosophy of division creating unity is evi-
dent. Not only were meetings held separately but even at the Medical
Aid Society separate medical officers and dentists were appointed for
coloured workers.
The GWU in effect maintained control over the No. 2 branch for it
was through the Central Executive Committee that agreements were
conducted. Although the separate branch could make representations it
had no voice on the Central Executive Committee and thus it was the No.
1 branch which dictated the union's bargaining position. The coloured
workers had virtually no say in their working conditions since this was
controlled by the organisation which represented the employers, the
Transvaal Clothing Manufacturers' Association (TCMA), and the GWU
sitting on the industrial council.
Support and Control, 1939-1948
Whereas before the outbreak of World War Two the number of blacks in
the clothing industry in the Transvaal was relatively small, from 1939
onwards their proportion of the labour force increased significantly.
This was a result of the phenomenal growth in the clothing industry
during the war years.
A complete stoppage of imported clothing along with the need to
fulfill orders from the Department of Defence provided the incentive
towards increased production in these years. The value of gross
output in the clothing industry increased by 76%, an increase greater
than that achieved by secondary industry in general over the same
period. The number of clothing factories in operation in the Trans-
vaal almost doubled from 158 in 1939 to 315 in 1945. Many of these
were small factories hoping to make a quick profit from the prevailing
circumstances. At the time of this expansion in the industry white
women were opting for alternative, generally higher paid, spheres of
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employment. They started moving out of clothing factories into muni-
tions plants and office jobs. This was the background to the manu-
facturers' cries of a labour shortage during the war years. One of
the employers even suggested that labour be recruited from the country-
side to Johannesburg through consultation with parents and by offering
to pay train fares. This plan was never put into operation. Instead
employers started proposing higher wages in order to entice employees
to remain in their employ. According to the president of the TCMA the
effect of this was that "fantastic wages" were paid. If profits were
to be maintained this situation could not be perpetuated. Manufacturers
sought other means of acquiring the necessary cheap labour in a labour
intensive industry.
They turned to the coloured and African population of the Witwaters-
rand. The number of coloured women in the area increased from 8 247 in
1921 to 20 711 in 1946. Over the same period the number of African
women resident on «ihe Witwatersrand increased almost tenfold from
28 735 to 220 833. Increasingly these coloured and African women
were drawn into the industry. (See Table 1) By 1946, whites, although
still constituting the largest part of the workforce, comprised only
55% of it. The percentage of Africans had risen to 25% (there were now
454 females and 2 313 males), coloureds had increased to 18% and
Indians to 2%. The coloured workers were nearly all female, in total
2 345 compared to 6 588 white females.
This influx of blacks into the industry during the war years had
major implications for trade union organisation. In numerical terms
the No. 2 branch of the union became much more powerful. From a
membership of 144 in 1940 the branch membership increased to 2 910 in
1946. (See Table 2). The No. 1 branch in the same time expanded its
membership from 5 938 to 7 000. (See Table 2). Membership figures of
the SACWU for the war years are not available, but by 1950 it had 1 299
members. Whereas before the war the rather small parallels had meek-
ly accepted the control exerted by the GWU, they now began to challenge
both managerial power and the authority of the GWU in determining their
affairs.
Throughout the 1940's the no. 2 branch's major initiatives were its
call for representation on the Central Executive Committee and the
industrial council. At the beginning of 1942, the No. 2 branch, with
its growing membership, was becoming increasingly displeased over the
inferior position it occupied in relation to the No. 1 branch. The
Central Executive Committee was elected only by members of the No. 2
branch and although a customary practice had been established to co-opt
members of other branches onto the Central Executive Committee (such as
Germiston), the No. 2 branch had been excluded. Subscriptions paid by
coloured members were incorporated into a general fund administerd by
the Central Executive Committee. Anna Scheepers, as president of the
union, automatically became president of the No. 2 branch and presided
over their executive meetings. The overall effect of this, according
to Hetty du Preez, organiser of the branch, was that they had become
mere "puppets of the CEC". Another member of the branch executive,
G.S. Davis, asserted "that as far as he could see the No. 2 branch was
not a branch at all".
Hester du Preez initially raised the issue of remiesentation on the
Central Executive Committee on behalf of the branch. Solly Sachs and
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the Central Executive Committee did not accede to this request claim-
ing, as they had done previously, that the result would be a split in
the union.
We in the Garment Workers' Union believe in the principle
that workers are workers, but we have to take into account
the fact that the majority of our members are imbued with
anti-colour prejudices which they bring with them from the
platteland. If we would force the issue that coloured work-
ers must be represented on the Committee we would split the
Union. Up to now we have had parallel organisations and we
must now decide if the time has come to change our policy. I
say no.
Nearly all the other members of the Central Executive echoed Sachs'
point. The Christian-National assaults on the union were particular-
ly emphasised for, although in 1942 these attacks were at a low point,
it was maintained that coloured representation would give the National-
ists "another point to attack the Union". It was only Ray Adler, who
along with Anna Scheepers attended No. 2 branch meetings in an advisory
capacity, who raised a dissenting voice to this general line. She did
not agree that the G.W.U. should be afraid of the enemies who were
attacking the union and accede to their demands. "The non-Europeans
are supporting the war effort and have joined up. We should give them
Branch representation on the CEC". Yet she was a lone voice in the
wilderness. She was shouted down by Hester Cornelius, Anna Scheepers
and Solly Sachs. Sachs launched into a tirade against Hester du Preez
for even daring to raise the issue claiming that she had done so
entirely on her own initiative with a view to splitting the union.
E.S. Sachs said that the person who is responsible for the
request of representation on the CEC ... has rendered the
Union and the Coloured workers a disservice. We were build-
ing up unity and strength in the Coloured branch but now this
action would cause disharmony. The No. 2 Branch are entitled
to make these requests but he felt that the request did not
come from the Coloured workers and that it was suggested by
someone who is trying to lay down a policy for us.
Du Preez countered this accusation by maintaining that "some workers
had raised the matter with her". In order to judge whether the work-
ers warrted representation she suggested that a general meeting be
called. Sachs, however, disagreed with this proposal. "It would
mean that the Coloured workers had their position of inferiority
flaunted in their faces once again." While it is unclear what Sachs
was attempting to assert in this statement it is evident that he did
not want the status quo which existed between the branches disturbed.
The meeting therefore broke up without any decision reached.
During 1942 the GWU was attempting to organise a National Union of
Garment Workers which wouljiL include "the thousands of coloured workers
in the Cape and Durban". Solly Sachs requested the No. 2 branch
executive that the question of representation be left in abeyance until
after the conference, for then the workers would realise "that they
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should stand together and not fight on racial ines". Sachs' plea was
seen as a sidestepping manoeuvre and members of the branch executive re-
peated their call for representation. Yet under the combined press-
ure of Sachs and the Central Executive Committee the branch relented
and decided to leave the matter over until after the conference.
The National Conference was scheduled for August 1942. In the in-
terim Sachs made an appeal to the white workers, at a general meeting
of the GWU, "to treat the coloured workers in the factory decently".
Workers, irrespective of race and political allegiances, should stand
together, he declared, "in order to be able to fight the bosses".
The white workers, however, did not heed his call for working class
unity. Although most of the members present at a shop stewards con-
ference held on 13 August 1942 were "in favour of better treatment to
the coloured workers", many of the shop stewards reported that the
white workers were against rjfipresentation of the No. 2 branch on the
Central Executive Committee. Sachs concluded from this that, as he
had always maintained, it was first of all necessary to educate '
masses" before the problem of representation could be / tackled.
Before a meeting of the No. 2 branch he reiterated his opinion that it
was "only a small number of workers who are pressing for representation
and not the branch members as a whole". D.u Preez was adamant that
the demand did not merely come "from a handful of workers as Mr Sachs
wanted to put it, but from the majority of Coloured workers". Again
the matter was not resolved and left in abeyance. On 19 August the
Central Executive eventually decided to make a firm decision with the
regard to representation. It passed a resolution which rejected No. 2
branch representation on the Central Executive Committee because, in
view of the racist attitudes- of the white workers, this was likely to
cause a split in the union. The Central Executive would concentrate
its efforts "£>n educating the masses of workers in true trade union
principles". While the workers were being educated a Joint Committee
would be established consisting of an equal number of representatives
from the Central Executive Committee and the No. 2 branch "to discuss
matters of mutual interest". This tactic tallied perfectly with
Sachs* "waiting until the time was ripe" philosophy.
The National Conference of garment workers was a dismal failure and
did not lead to a re-education of the white workers. The No. 2
branch received the resolution from the Central Executive Committee and
treated it for what it was, a mere sop to the branch's request. J.
Philips, the chairman of the No. 2 branch, was "not at all satisfied
with the reply he received from the CEC" and advised the
 R£EC to
"conduct a vigorous campaign for unity amongst the workers". Al-
though Philips rejected the concept of joint meetings as a solution it
is notable that he actually accepted the premises of the executive's
argument, namely that it was the white workers who were holding up the
process of change. At this stage he did not recognise that Sachs and
his cadre on the Central Executive Committee were also playing a vital
role in perpetuating the status quo between the No. 1 and No. 2
branches so as not to place their respective leadership positions in
danger.
Over the next year, as the No. 2 branch continued demanding repre-
sentation on the Central Executive Committee, Philips became increas-
ingly disillusioned with the stand which Sachs was taking. He accused
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Sachs of concentrating all his engergy on the No. 1 branch and neglect-
ing the No. 2 branch. Sachs immediately called in the Central Execu-
tive Committee to justify his stand. The Committee recorded "its
satisfaction of the fact that the secretary in all his dealings with
the No. 2J)ranch has merely tried to carry out correctly the policy of
the CEC". The Central Executive also resolved that the issue of
representation had been dragging on for too long and unilaterally
terminated discussions until such time as "important developments" took
place.
The No. 2 branch executive did not let matters rest there. Philips
went to Cape Town to drum up support for the branch • s cause from the
non-racial Cape Garment Workers' Union. While in Cape Town he told
the Cape union "that if they (±he No. 2 branch) did not say yes to Mr
Sachs, there goes their job". The branch also refused to repudiate
articles in Inkululeko, Cape Standard and the Trade Union Bulletin
condemning the GWU (Tvl's) approach to multi-racialism in their trade
union. Two Indian members of the branch, Naidoo and Mobdley, began
attempting to mobilise coloured workers against the union because of
the colour bar and accused the Central Executive Committee of not
pursuing trade union principles. They pressed for complete
disaffiliation of. the branch from the GWU and the establishment of a
separate union. This the Central Executive Committee would not
tolerate, as an indepedent union could move out of its orbit of
control. It therefore decided to take drastic action, expelled Naidoo
and Moodley from the union, dissolved the No. 2 branch and set about
reconstituting a more compliant branch.
Sachs explained the outbursts of hostilities between the No. 2
branch and the Central Executive Committee and the "need" for the
eventual dissolution of the branch in terms of an agitator thesis. The
workers, he claimed, were satisfied with the existing relationship and
it was only "until a demand for_ division inspired from outsiders was
presented" that cracks appeared. In order to reconstitute the branch
and the harmonious relationship which had existed before it was there-
fore not urgent to redress the basic grievances relating to representa-
tion but to appeal directly to the coloured workers to express their
faith in the parallel relationship. A general meeting of coloured
workers for this purpose was called in February 1944. Sachs opened the
meeting urging the workers to express a vote of confidence in him, the
President and the Central Executive Committee. Philips saw no need
for this vote "as at no time did the members say they had no confidence
in the Central Executive Committee and officials".
As Sachs was speaking about reorganising the No. 2 branch he noted
that Naidoo was at the meeting. He indicated that he would not con-
tinue with the meeting until Naidoo left, which the latter refused to
do. The meeting became rowdy and "Mr Naidoo was put out of the
meeting by force". When the vote was taken a large majority voted in
favour of Sachs, the rest abstained and no one dissented.
This meeting was followed up by one between the Central Executive
Committee and shop stewards of the No. 2 branch. It was very badly
attended on the part of the shop stewards. The reorganization of the
branch was formalised and a condemnation of the articles was unanimous-
ly approved. A branch committee was to be formed consisting of twenty
members to be elected by a shop stewards meeting and later endorsed by
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a general meeting. On the question of representation on the Central
Executive Committee Sachs was adamant^that "it would not be possible to
grant this at the present juncture". Scheepers did, however, state
that the Central Executive Committee would not object to a joint meet-
ing with the No. 2 branch when discussing proposals for a new agree-
ment. In conclusion she expressed the hope that the Central Exec-
utive Committee and executive of the branch would "work together in
future in harmony and co-operation". The No. 2 branch, although it
still persisted in its demand for representation, never again chall-
enged the control of the Central Executive Committee and became an
obedient child.
The request by the No. 2 branch for representation on the industrial
council was met with an equally unenthusiastic response by the Central
Executive Committee and with opposition from manufacturers. Given the
branch's non-representation on the industrial council, the Central
Executive Committee had to act on its behalf to put forward the
branch's case. Within the Executive there were divisions over what
should be done on this issue. Hay Adler was firmly in favour of rep-
resentation on the industrial council and urged the Central Executive
press the issue. Hester Cornelius reiterated her argument that such
a move "would harm the Union". The president of the union, Anna
Scheepers felt that some of the employers would object to such a move
and refuse to "sit on the council with non-European workers". Solly
Sachs stated rather ambiguously that "if the European workers objected
to representation on the Council he would definitely oppose it". It
is unclear whether he meant he would oppose representation or the
objections of white workers. Given his statements relating to repre-
sentation on the Central Executive Committee it would seem that he
meant the former. The executive did nonetheless decide to approach the
chairman of the industrial council and poll his views on what the
attitude of the employers would be.
Sachs met with Mr Brown, the chairman, who was of the opinion that
there would definitely be opposition from employers to coloureds on the
council. This attitude on the part of employers was incomprehensible
to the No. 2 branch executive. As one member stated when the subject
was initially raised, "If they are prepared to sit wi4*h European
workers thay can just as well sit with Coloured workers". Some of
the members of the TCMA were definitely racially hostile and JJdid not
wish to sit on the Council with coloured representatives". The
employers' association nonethless realised that if the union chose a
coloured as a delegate they would have to accept it. It would not,
however, encourage such representation and informed the No. 2 branch
that it thought present Union delegates fully represented all
sections of the industry and that their interests were being
ably served. It was considered, therefore, that the existing
arrangements should not be disturbed.
With the GWU No. 1 branch not in favour of representation on the
Central Executive Committee it was highly unlikely that they would
choose coloured delegates for the council. Indeed, as we shall see, it
was only two years after the war that the first coloured delegate was
appointed by the union to the council.
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Not only did the organization of Indian and coloured workers in the
clothing industry on the Witwatersrand flourish during World War Two
but African worker organisation in the industry, and indeed throughout
industry in South Africa, grew at a phenomenal rate. According to
O'Meara by 1945 at least 40% of Africans in commerce and private in-
dustry were unionised. Most of these unions were affiliated to the
umbrella body established for black trade unions in 1941, the Council
of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU). £NETU had, by 1945, 119 union
affiliates and a membership of 158 000. This phenomenal quantitative
growth in organisation had largely come about as a result of the sub-
stantially improved bargaining position held by Africans in the
specific context of a wartime economy. The semi-skilled functions
which they were performing, at a time when white labour was scarce,
made Africans less easy to displace and therefore less vulnerable to
dismissal. State policy towards African workers was also shifting at
the time, the attitude being adopted that it was necessary to ensure
that the 'war effort1 would not be disrupted by industrial stoppages.
Following a wave of strikes the government enacted War Measure 145 of
December 1942 which outlawed strikes by Africans with severe sanc-
tions. This alone could not end strikes and it became necessary to
afford African unions some apparatus whereby they could channel their
grievances. The Department of Labour insisted that industrial council
agreements fix wages for Africans and published a series of Wage Board
determinations. 1942/43 saw a spectacular increase in the number of
Africans for whom wage determinations were made, the numbers covered
rising from 1 084 to 67 632. Trade union organisers now had some-
thing which
 Qthey could legally enforce and trade union organisation
mushroomed. The SACWU, which had long been pressing for inclusion
in the industrial council agreement for the clothing industry in the
Transvaal and/or a revived Wage Board determination, was at the fore-
front of the revival in African trade unionism.
During the war the SACWU intensified its efforts for inclusion in
the agreement and/or a new Wage Determination. The SACWU's attempts
received limited support from the GWU but was rejected by most manu-
facturers. Shortly before the outbreak of World War Two the GWU had
refused to negotiate on behalf of the African male workers as a Wage
Board determination was imminent. The GWU opposed the recommenda-
tions made by the Wage Board in 1939 on the basis of the low wages
which it had fixed for dressmakers and milliners. Manufacturers, on
the other hand, asserted that the wages were too high. The
recommendations were therefore never published as a determination. The
SACWU once again turned its efforts towards extending the agreement to
African workers. This request was received sympathetically by the
GWU. At a meeting between representatives of both associations it was
decided to write to the industrial council asking that pass-bearing
Africans be included in the agreement. It was nonethelss not viewed
by the GWU as a sufficiently fundamental issue to hold up the signing
of the agreement.
Relations between the SACWU and the GWU were, at the time, rather
tenuous. Wages and other expenses of the SACWU were being paid out bv
the GWU until such time as the former could "stand on its own feet".
In June 1940 the GWU also made a loan to Makabeni, the secretary of the
SACWU, of £8 in order to attend his mother's funeral. While he was
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away the administration of the SACWU's office was neglected and the GWU
paid the rent of £4 for August. This accumulated debt worried the
Central Executive Committee. Anna Scheepers complained that the GWU
"paid out more on their behalf than we received". Johanna Cornelius
suggested that Makabeni be asked "whether the money would be paid
out". The Central Executive agreed to investigate the position of
the SACWU once Makabeni returned from his mother's funeral. The
matter, however, was left in abeyance for eight years when the Central
Executive Committee demanded that the debt be paid in full im-
mediately.
The Central Executive's attention was diverted by the Minister of
Labour's (Walter Madeley) refusal to publish the agreement which was
concluded in May 1940 between the XCMA and the GWU because of the
IIS
definition of the clothing industry. The SACWU utilised this gap to
mobilise its members and press for its inclusion in the agreement. On
September 1941 a general meeting was held at the non-European Trade
Hall. At this "well attended" meeting it was unanimously resolved
to pressurise for coverage by the agreement or that the Wage Board
recommendation of 1939 be published- It is perhaps indicative for
the nature of organisation in the SACWU that it took over a month to
forward these resolutions to the Minister of Labour, by which time he
had already published the agreement. Madeleyrs decision to publish had
come in the face of a massive mobilisation of garment workers at mass
meetings in Johannesburg and Germiston whereftthey had threatened strike
action if the agreement was not published.
When negotiations re-opened in May 1942 the SACWU submitted another
memorandum to the TCMA, the GWU and the Department of Labour calling
for the extension of the agreement or a revision of Wage Determination
No. 42. In particular the SACWU was concerned about those workers in
the industry who were not directly involved in clothing production such
as boiler attendants, motor car drivers, mechanics, packers, machine
belt fixers, deliverers anfU nightwatchmen and did not fall under
determination or agreement. A statistical survey carried out by the
TCMA found that 715 of the 1 225 African males in the industry were not
employed on production. This group of workers, according to the
SACWU, was the most exploited of all workers in the industry.
They work 48 and more hours per week, while others work 46
hours a week. They continue working when others have a rest
for 10 minutes. They remain behind when others finish off
their day's work. When their grievances are brought to the
attention of the ..- Department of Labour under Wage
Determination No. 70, as their work is identical with that of
the Commercial and Distributive Trade the explanation is
always that they are employed in the manufacturing establish-
ments . From the law operating for manufacturing establish-
ments , they are excluded. It is said that they are not
factory workers. Where do these workers belong?
Manufacturers were vehemently opposed to including these workers in
its agreement with the GWU. The chairman of the TCMA expressed the
fear that it could lead to joint strike action by Africans and
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whites. The GWU wanted all workers to be covered by the agreement
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but was not prepared to make it a contentious issue with the TCMA.
In the circumstances the GWU recommended that "the proper way of
settling this long outstanding problem once and for all would be to
have a complete new investigation into the Garment Making Trades".
Negotiations between the TCMA and the GWU had reached a deadlock over
whether Easter Monday should be a paid holiday and the cost-of-living
allowance. Under War Measure No. 9, which provided for compulsory
arbitration in the case of a deadlock in negotiations, an arbitrator
was appointed. As the inclusion of Africans in the agreement was
not in dispute, the arbitrator did not decide on this issue. The
effect of the arbitration award was a substantial increase in wages for
the garment workers.
The Minister did however decide to appoint a Wage Board investiga-
tion into the clothing industry in the Transvaal which would cover all
employees in the industry not covered by the agreement. As a result of
the investigation Wage Determination No. 120 was published in July
1944. The average wages of African male workers on production were
£2.17.8 pe_rpcweek and those not employed on production received £2.8.1
per week. Averages hide the huge wage differentials between
categories of labour. In terms of the determination, .mechanics earned
£6.13.6 per week and messengers and cleaners £1.12.0. Pressers and
cutters received £1.10.0 as beginners rising to £4.0.0 when qualified
after three years in the industry. The SACWU was pleased with the
determination but it noted that a major category of labour was omitted,
that of machinist.
The publication of the determination instead of defusing African
worker militancy in the industry actually intensified it. It high-
lighted for the workers the anomalous conditions under which they
laboured. African males had to work 46 hours a week while workers
covered by the agreement were working 44 hours and they had two weeks
holiday on full pay compared to three weeks in the agreement. This
situation was "causing a great deal of unrest" among African workers in
the industry. Employers were compelling their African employees to
remain behind or come back^ on Saturdays to complete the 46 hour week,
which aggrieved workers. It is little wonder that the attempts by
the SACWU to explain the different workings of the agreement and wage
determination failed to satisfy the workers who did "not see the reason
of two different laws for one industry". As part of CNETU's campaign
for African unions to press £gr recognition the SACWU requested the
TCMA to recognise the union. Recognition in this instance meant
legal recognition in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act. As
Makabeni noted* "they preferred no recognition at all to non-statutory
recognition". Manufacturers took a differing approach to this
request. Larger concerns were at the time becoming receptive to the
practice of personnel management.
It is realised today, that to have an efficient and com-
petitive industry it is essential that relations between
management and personnel should be harmonious and cordial,
and these measures are all directed at creating a willing and
contented army of workers which Jiyjst react to the mutual
benefit of employer and employee.
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In an effort to establish these harmonious relations- nine factories
had introduced stop order facilities for the SACWU. Nonetheless,
not much was done during the early 40's to employ these ideas. The
TCMA refused to recognise the SACWU. According to one manufacturer
it was not necessary to grant such recognition because
Natives were not Europeans; they were childish in many re-
spects and consequently were treated more liberally than they
would be otherwise.
Matters reached a head in December 1945 when the factories closed
for their annual holiday period.
All factories closed for at least three weeks, during which time
workers covered by the agreement received full pay. In terms of the
determination Africans were only entitled to two weeks annual paid
leave. The employers demanded from their African workers that they
sign a declaration stating they would not demand paid.leave above two
weeks. Those that refused to sign were given notice. The result
was that "scores of .porkers" were dismissed because they refused to
sign the indemnity. The GWU expressed concern over the treatment
which was being meted out to the African workers. The Secretary for
Labour indignantly expressed the opinion that this concern smacked,
"i*1? • 'rr .A
of hypocrisy when considered in relation to the support which
they accord to the employers on the industrial council in
their refusal to extend the agreement to natives.
This attack was unjustified, for, as we have seen, the GWU had not
collaborated with the TCMA in this respect. It had rather not
persisted with the issue in order that its own interests might not be
threatened- According to Sachs the GWU Central Executive "felt that
employers would extend the more favourable conditions to them
(Africans) in any case".
When work resumed in January 400 African workers in Germiston came
out on strike demanding that they receive three weeks paid leave like
others in the industry. The GWU entered the fray and took a leading
part in the negotiations raising the ire of manufacturers. When the
spokesman for the employers, Mr Saffer, entered the negotiating room to
meet the SACWU's representatives
he found Mr Sachs and Miss de Wet of the GWU. He asked why
they were there and Mr Sachs replied that unofficially the
native union was a branch of the GWU, and he was spokesman
for the natives. His Union was going to give them full
support.
This clearly indicates the measure of control which the GWU had over
the SACWU. It was in the GWU's interests to resolve the conflict as
speedily as possible in order to ensure that whites would not be locked
out if the factories closed. In addition the three weeks annual paid
leave in the agreement was threatened. On the GWU's request the SACWU
and the Germiston employers agreed that the matter be brought before a
special meeting of the industrial council. This effectively meant
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that negotiations on behalf of the African workers was taken out of the
hands of the SACWU and placed in the hands of the GWU. The GWU backed
down on the strikers demands, accepting two additional days paid leave,
no victimisation of strikers and a re-instatement of all workers fired
in December. The GWU also assured the employers that all strikers
would return to work, which they duly did. The strikers were not given
pay for the time they were on strike by the employers, and although it
was suggested that the GWU reimburse the strikers for wages lost there
is no evidence in the fflflJ's income and expenditure account of such an
amount being paid out.
As was noted earlier one of the most significant changes in the
labour force in the clothing industry during the war years was the
steady, but slow, influx of African women. (See Table 1 ) . Unlike
their male counterparts nearly all African^ women in the industry (56%
out of 588) were employed on production. Most of these women occ-
upied jo-b, categories held by white and coloured women in the in-
dustry. If unorganised these workers could present a major threat
of job and wage undercutting. Coloured workers were refusing to work
with African, jwomen because they felt that "African women would take
their jobs". White women voiced complaints of "non-Europeans . . .
doing the same sort of
 1wtork as themselves, even though on the different
floor of the factory". On the shop floor union organisers had to
step in in order to prevent racial conflicts, invariably with the
interests of whites, coloureds and then Africans taking precedent in
that order. Hetty du Preez visited a factory where coloureds would not
work with Africans- and secured the replacement of the Africans by
coloured workers. In the case of whites the Nationalist assaults on
the union were beginning to gather momentum, and this time racial-
ism on the shop-floor was a major tactic utilised in the attack.
These attitudes put a brake on the GWU•s attempts to organise
African workers. It was necessary to organise these workers in closer
cooperation with the Central Executive Committee than was the case with
the SACWU because their jobs were similar to whites. Greater control
could be exercised if they were part of the same union. In 1942 the
industrial council had sought legal opinion on the position of African
women workers, who did HO-t hold passes, in terms of the Industrial
Conciliation Act of 1937. The advocate•s opinion was that they were
employees in terms of the act. The Secretary for Labour rejected
the opinion on the basis that the women were employed on "works" as
defined in the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911. Following this
up the GWU took a test case to the Supreme Court. Two employees, an
African male, Baloyi, and an African female, Christine Okolo, applied
for a declaration .,t&at they were employees in terms of the Industrial
Conciliation Act. Justice Murray ruled that Baloyi was not an
employee but that Okolo was as she was not a "pass-bearing native".
The GWU immediately demanded back pay for all African women who were
underpaid and this amounted to £1 100 per employee.
The GWU's problems were not over in this regard as when it attempted
to organise the African women in the union the coloured workers were
reluctant to admit them to the No. 2 branch. Makabeni had always
referred complaints by African women to1 (Hetty du Preez and informally
these workers were part of the branch. Leaders of the branch were
in favour of the formal incorporation of African women into their ranks
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but the workers were not too enthusiastic about the idea. A Mrs Flask
reported thai "the workers in her factory did not want to mix with
Africans". Groups of workers in factories milled about discussing
the fact that Hetty du Preez was going to represent Africans. Du
Preez was aware of these feelings of antagonism but she insisted that
the coloured workers "must realise that they must organise on indus-
trial lines, and there was no room for such sentiments". A general
meeting of the branch was called to resolve the issue.
The meeting, primarily concerning itself with the Indian Passive
Resistance campaign, was attended by 4 000 people, far in excess of the
branch's membership. Before the meeting was terminated the resolu-
tion calling for African females to be represented in the branch was
passed almost unnoticed. A general meeting of African women workers
was then called. It was attended by approximately 200 workers and five
representatives were elected to the branch executive by a show of
hands. Among the five representatives elected was Lucy Mvubelo who
is today general secretary of the NUCW.
Passing reference has been made in the latter section of this paper
to the role played by parallels in the wider worker movement. Both the
SACWU and the No. 2 branch where affiliated ta CNETU, Makabeni being
its president and James Philips its treasurer. While the SACWU did
not approach the GWU for permission to affiliate to CNETU, the branch
had to apply for sanction from the Central Executive Committee. Solly
Sachs had played a major role in laying down CNETU's organisational
structure, he being the chairman of a,commission of inquiry, appointed
by CNETU, to order its own affairs. The Central Executive Committee
therefore had little hesitation in endorsing the decision of the No. 2
branch to affiliate. Despite CNETU•s numerical strength, it was
"the most powerful African trade union grouping ever to have existed in
South Africa", _its organisation was fragmented, unstable and lacked
effective muscle. Its only -income was an allowance of £12 a month
from the Bantu Welfare Trust. The CEC realised that CNETU was weak
organisationally and was not prepared to grant i£7,a loan of £110 in
1945 because CNETU was "not functioning properly". Scheepers echoed
Sachs' opinion but added that
A committee should be established to train these people how
to manage their affairs and become proper trade union
organisers and secretaries.
She did not indicate what she meant by a 'proper' trade unionist but
the statement has clear paternal overtones.
CNETU's ^trength was shortlived and by 1949 66 CNETU unions had
foundered. Its failure seems to have lain in its weak organisa-
tional structure which was not able to stand up to the post-war
recession. In 1951 the remainders of CNETU, including the No. 2
branch of the GWU, met and discussed the establishment of a trade union
umbrella body which would oppose the South African Trades and Labour
Council (SATLC) -to, which many registered unions, including the GWU,
were affiliated. As the branch was part of the GWU, the GWU Central
Executive Committee would not tolerate such actions. The Central
Executive asserted that "it would be most unconstitutional for us to
take part in the formation of any rival organisation". The branch
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was therefore instructed "not to take any further part in this matter"
and to "submit a-full report to Head Office as soon as possible on the
... conference". Clearly the GWU would not let its child get out of
control to the extent that it might undermine the union's position.
In general then during the war years the parallels attempted to
utilise the specific conditions to gain a greater degree of independent
control. They had limited success in their endeavours for once they
began to tread on the toes of the GWU, they were sharply rapped on the
knuckles and brought back into line. Although the 'happy family' had
threatened to disintegrate by 1946 it was still very much intact with
the parent firmly in control.
In the post-war years the GWU's 'family' drew even closer together.
The major factor which influenced these relationships during this per-
iod was the intensification of the trend of whites leaving the industry
and blacks entering it. In 1946 whites constituted approximately 55% of
the labour force in the clothing industry on the Witwatersrand and
blacks 45%. Ten years later blacks constituted two-thirds of the work-
force in the industry. This trend had a tremendous impact on Solly
Sachs and the union.
The war seems to have confirmed for Sachs that capitalism could be a
progressive force in South Africa. Intensive secondary industrialisa-
tion had brought whites and blacks together in factories. Sachs envis-
aged that this general proletarianisation would ultimately lead to com-
bined opposition to the capitalist classes. In Sachs' terms there-
fore the time was ripe for a slow and gradual introduction of a closer
working relationship between the GWU and its parallels.
However, there was one major factor which militated against this
occurring, the intensification of the Nationalist assaults on the GWU.
The Nationalists used the growing number of blacks in the industry in
an attempt to stir up racial antagonism and undermine the GWU's leader-
ship hierarchy. The GWU had therefore to tread very carefully in its
relationship with its parallels in order to ensure that the National-
ists could not seize on issues where they could proclaim blacks were
being favoured above whites.
Relations with the No. 2 branch carried on very much the same as
during the war, except that the branch did not challenge the authority
of the Central Executive. The growing number of members of the branch
did, nonetheless, place pressure on the Central Executive Committee to
make some concessions to the branch over representation. Sachs stated
that "the No. 2 branch does represent over 3oQ00 members and can there-
fore feel that they are entitled to a say". He had decided to draft
a new constitution for the GWU and give the branch representation on
the Medical Aid Society and industrial council. Although Philips
welcomed the move he informed the branch committee that he would^nly
be satisfied once they enjoyed "the same privileges as the CEC". A
year passed, the constitution was not drafted and the branch still did
not have representation on the industrial council. When the branch
approached the Central Executive Committee on this question the Nation-
alist assaults on the union were reaching their zenith. The GWU was
attempting to eradicate all areas of possible racial friction which the
Nationalists could seize upon. It requested that at the offices of the
industrial council blacks and whites be kept separate and not congre-
gate in the same area. The Central Executive was therefore not
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willing to press the representation issue as "European workers might
object to non-European workers" on the same body. Philips replied,
in a rather meek fashion, that he "did not think that the No. 2 branch
would press for representation. There were heated arguments in that
connection in the past". The matter was therefore left in abeyance
until a new constitution for the GWU was registered, which was not
until 1953. The branch was nonetheless given representation on the
Medical Aid Society, but the delegate to the Society was appointed by
the Central Executive and not the branch executive never mind the
workers. Shop-floor organisation and a leadership responsive to it
was therefore squashed.
The SACWU also came under closer control by the GWU. Support was
forthcoming from the GWU but with the GWU exerting virtual control.
This was knowhere more evident than in the dispute between the SACWU
and the Star Shirt Clothing Factory and Trade Steam Pressers. The* GWU,
Sachs in particular, assumed almost total control of the union side of
negotiations. At issue in the dispute was the discrepancy between the
agreement and determination over hours of work and annual leave. Mr
Glazer, the manager of Star Shirt, had in September 1947 advised his
African workers that he was increasing their hours of work from 42j£
hours lag in the agreement) to 46 hours per week (as in the determina-
tion). The workers approached the SACWU ami-informed the union they
were not prepared to accept these conditions. Makabeni reported the
matter to Solly Sachs who then contacted Glazer and persuaded the
latter to resume work at the old conditions. Then a week before
Christmas Glazer sacked his African workers and told them to report for
re-employment on 5 January. He also told the workers that they
would only be paid for two weeks leave as against three weeks for those
working under the agreement. When closing day came ±he workers
demanded three weeks pay which Glazer refused to concede. Glazer
then called in the uolice to the factory and in their presence dis-
charged the workers. On returning to work on 5 January Glazer told
the workers they would have to work a 4&, hour week. The workers re-
fused and found themselves unemployed. The GWU viewed this as a
very serious issue as the conditions of work of white pressers could be
threatened by the outcome of the dispute. At a meeting of the indus-
trial council the GWU delegates made it clear that
the pressing section is an important part of the Industry,
that many members of our Union were employed in that Section
and that a lowering of conditions of work for Native workers
will adversely affect members of the Union.
The GWU therefore submitted the matter under dispute to the indus-
trial council and, when it was not resolved there, to an arbitrator.
Glazer and Makabeni "agreed to accept unreservedly the findings of the
Arbitrator". The arbitrator ruled that the workers were to work
hours per week, the unemployed workers were to be reinstated and given
two-thirds pay for the .time they were out of work from 5 January to
date of reinstatement. Clearly this was a great victory for co-
operation between the SACWU and GWU. Yet the virtual monopolisation of
the bargaining by the GWU boded ill for any attempts to create an in-
dependent leadership among the rank and file African male workers.
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The GWU also decided that the time had come to call in its debt from
the SACWU. According to Makabeni the SACWU was still in an unstable
financial position and requested that the money it owed be written off
as a bad debt. On behalf of the Central Executive Anna Scheepers
replied that since the SACWU was now receiving an income of over £1 300
per annum the Executive was not prepared to continue carrying the
burden of the SACWU. "Once peonle are able to stand on their own
feet, others should be assisted." This intransigent attitude on
behalf of the GWU perhaps resulted from the coming to power of the
Herenigde Nasionale Party in May 1948. It would be far better to call
in this debt, risk the enmity of the SACWU, rather than give the state
a weapon with which to attack the union.
Although therefore there were a few cracks in the relationship with
its parallels by 1948 the GWU had established a ' happy family' with
itself in the parental role: "the family that prays together and stays
together through sickness and health till death us do part." The
parallels achieved a great deal of benefit from the support it received
from the GWU, in particular the 40 hour week and huge amounts of back
pay. Hand in hand with this support came control exercised by the GWU.
The product was therefore not so much either support or control but
support and control.
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W = Whites; - I = Indians; - C = Coloureds; - A = Africans; - T = Total
It must be noted that these figures do not include tailoring workshops where most of the Indians were employed.
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